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ABSTRACT 
This paper reviews the theory of price specification and 
considers the comparative static analysis of demand subject to 
alternative rate schedules. An econometric analysis of the 1975 
Washington Center for Metropolitan Studies survey resolves four 
empirical issues  related to the estimation of the demand for 
electricity: (1) measured average price and measured marginal price 
are statistically endogenous so that least squares technique s are not 
appropriate for the determination of price and income elasticities, 
(2) while the rate structure premium (RSP ) has established theoretical 
merit its statistical contribution is negligible, (3) consumer 
behavior in the demand for electricity follows the marginal price 
rather than the average price specification, and (4) estimates of 
price responsiveness are not statistically different using the 
tail-end price rather than the true marginal price. 
We demonstrate a pratical way of making probabilistic 
comparisons between alternative rate schedules which is applied in 
several examples to illustrate the prevalance of block switching. The 
methodology is easily applied to inverted tariff schedules even when 
structural parameters have been determined from a cross-section of 
individuals who face declining block rates. 
SDWLATION OF THE DEMAND FOR FLECTRICITY 
UNDER ALTERNATIVE RATE STRUCTURES1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Recent studies in the demand for electricity have raised 
again the question of price specification. The early work of 
Houthakl::er (1951a) discussed demand subject to a quantity 
dependent rate structure as compared to the classical situation 
of parametrically given prices. Taylor (1975), in his survey of 
the electricity demand literature, reviews the rate structure 
problem and indicates a simple procedure which converts the 
complex optimization problem of the consumer to the standard case 
of a linear budget constraint set in marginal prices. 
Modifications to the Taylor procedure were noted by Berndt (1978) 
and Nordin (1976). 
A behavioral question is whether consumers can detect 
prevailing marginal rates in the presence of automatic appliances 
and billing cycle variations. An alternative hypothesis suggests 
that consumers respond to a summarizing statistic for the 
quantity dependent rate structure such as average price. 
This paper reviews the theory of price specification ana 
considers the comparative static analysis of demand under 
alternative rate structures. We investigate the statistical 
endogeneity of prices whose construction depends on tne observed 
2 
in 1975 by the Washington Center for Metropolitan Studies (WCMS).2 
We consider the problem of determining demand response subject 
to non-marginal changes in the underlying budget set. An important 
illustration attempts to predict the probability of block switching 
when consumers are shifted from declining to inverted block rate 
structures. 
Section II considers the theory of price specification while 
Section III presents empirical estimates of price responsiveness. 
Section IV presents the simulation of demand under alternative rate 
schedules and Section V provides a brief summary and some conclusions. 
II. SPECIFICATION OF PRICE: THEORY 
1. Quantity Dependent Rate Structure 
We begin by reviewing the general quantity dependent outlay or 
expenditure function. Let B(Q) be the total expenditure on 
electricity when an amount Q is consumed. The rate structure premium, 
B(Q) - B' (Q)Q, is on adjustment to income such that consumers choose 
quantity level Q at constant marginal price B ' (Q). 
If V(P, Y) is the indirect utility at prices p and income level 
Y then the consumer's optimal choice of quantity subject to the 
expenditure function B(Q) solves the problem: 
MAX V[B'(Q), Y - [B(Q) - B'(Q)Q] ]. 
Q 
The first-order condition implies that optimal Q is given as 
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the solution to Roy's identity: 
Vp[B'(Q), Y (B(Q) - B'(Q)Q)] Q = 
- Vy[B'(Q), Y (B(Q) - B'(Q)Q)] 
= D[B'(Q), Y - (B(Q) - B'(Q)Q)] 
where D[P,Y] is the Harshallian demand curve. Thus Q is not generally 
given as a reduced formed in terms of prices, income, and other 
parameters of the uncompensated demand function. Furthermore the 
usual monotonicity properties of the demand function are not 
sufficient to imply unique optimal conslllllption levels. 
The case of the declining block rate structure is somewhat 
more structured and permits us to derive a simple relation amoung 
quantity, average price, marginal price, and the rate structure 
premium. A declining block rate schedule implies an expenditure 
function which increases in linear segments, the slope of each 
succeeding segment being smaller than the one preceeding it. 
Suppose : 
B = C 
B = C + lll(Q - Xl) 
r-1 
B = C + � (X. - X.)n. + n (Q - X )  
_ 3+1 J J r r 
for 0 5. Q 5. xl 
for� < Q � x2 
for xr < Q 5. xr+l' 1 < r 5. n 
where X. denote the lower block boundaries and where we have set 
1 
x = "' n+l • The constant C is the connect charge and n. is the price of J 
electricity in block j. Suppose measured cons1J111ption, Q•, lies in the 
rth block so that Xr < Q• i Xr+l and total expenditure, B*, is 
r-1 
C + \ (X.+l - X.)n. + l! (Q* - X ). We then define the measured fe1 l J J  r r 
average price as B*/Q*, the measured marginal price as l!r' and the 
rate structure premilllll (RSP) as the difference between total 
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expenditure and the cost of purchasing the quantity Q• at the marginal 
rate nr: RSP = B* - l!rQ•. Dividing by quantity we obtain the simple 
relation average price = marginal price + RSP/Q•. Taylor (1975) shows 
that the rate structure premilllll is an adj ustment to income such that 
conslllllers choose quantity q* at price l!r and income level Y - RSP. 
2. Comparative Static Analysis of Demand Subiect to a Declining Block 
Rate Structure 
We now consider the comparative static analysis of demand 
subj ect to a declining block rate structure. Let U[q, Z] denote the 
utility derived from the consumption of electricity q and a Hicksian 
or nllllleraire commodity z. We ass1J111e a two-tier tariff for electricity 
with the price of electiricity l! given by 
(1) l! = { 
l!l 
l!2 
for 0 5. q 5. X 
for X < q with n1 ) n2 
Normalizing the price of the numeraire commodity to equal one the 
budget constraint satisfies: 
(2) l!l q + z 5. y for q 5. X 
n1X + (q - X)n2 + Z 5. y for X < q 
where y denotes income. 
[Insert Diagram 1 and 2 here] 
We illustrate the declining tariff in Diagram 1 and the 
corresponding budget set in Diagram 2. 
Denote by D[n, y; Pl the Marshallian or till.compensated demand 
for electricity where p is a vector of behavioral parameters and l et 
• 
lT denote the price at which demand equals the l ower block botllldary, 
• 
i. e . ,  D[n • y; Pl e X. Let q1 denote demand along the segment with 
slope n1 and l et q2 denote demand along the segment with slope n2• 
Demand along the first budget segment satisfies 
(4) � = D[n1• y; Pl for Cn2• n1> e s1 
whil e demand in the second segment satisfies 
(5) � = D[n2• y - Cn1 - n2)X; Pl for Cn2• n1) £ s2 
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We have defined the sets s1 and s2 to indicate which price 
pairs Cn2• n1) imply optimal first and second segment demand. We show 
bel ow  that s1 and s2 constitute a proper partition of all prices which 
correspond to decl ining two-part tariffs. Note that the term 
Cn1 - n2)X is the rate structure premium adjustment for demand in the 
marginal or tail-end block. We now derive certain results concerD.J.ng 
l ocal price response. 
Lemma 1: Suppose the till.Compensated demand for el ectricity is 
decreasing in price and increasing in income. Then: 
la) 
lb) 
le) 
a�/an1 < o 
a�/an1 < o 
a'Li,/an2 < o 
for (n2. nl) £ sl 
for Cn2• n1) e s2 
and Cn2• n1) £ s2 
Proof Lemma 1: 
l a) By assumption demand is downward sloping • 
lb) a�/an1 = (DY
)(-X) < 0 since we have assumed that 
el ectricity is a normal good. 
le) aQ_fan2 = D + D X i D + D q2 since Xi Q_. But D + D q2 � n y n y � n y 
equals the partial derivative with respect to price of the 
Hicksian or compensated demand dunction (by Slutsky's rel ation) 
and is thus negative. 
• 
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Remarks: • For n1 � n • q1 i X by Lemma l a. For n1 < n • q1 > X so that 
optimal demand falls outside the range in which n1 is the prevail ing 
• 
price. Furthermore Lemma le  implies that for n2 < n • � > X. The 
• 
pattern of prices in which n2 < n i n1 impl ies that q1 and q2 are 
each feasibl e. 
Let V(n, y) be the indirect utility ftlllction corresponding to the 
probl em Mar U[q, Z] subject to nq + Z i y. 
q,Z 
budget segment with price n1 is optimal when 
• 
For n2 < n i n1• the 
V Cn1• y) > V Cn2• y - Cn1 - n2
)X). It is cl ear that combinations of n1 
• 
and n2 erist which satisfy n2 < n i n1 and imply equal indirect 
util ity so that demand for el ectricity is multi-valued. For the set 
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of prices which imply equal indirect utility a trade -off exists where 
an increase in n1 may be compensated by a decrease in n2• We have the 
following result: 
Lemma 2: Let S = {(n2, n1)1V(n1, y )  = V(n2, y - (n1 - n2)X) and 
• 
n2 < n i n1J. Then an1/an2 < 0 for Cn2, n1) & S and for 
Vy(n1, y) < Vy(n2, y - (n1 - n2)X). 
Proof Lemma 2: Let V = V [n1, y] and V yl y Y2 
For Cn2• n1) & S, 
VY[n2, y - Cn1 - n2)X]. 
(an1/an2> • v = v + V <<- X)((an1/an2> - 1)). Then nl n2 Y2 
(an1/an2> (V + V X) = V + V X which implies nl Y2 n2 Y2 
(anl/an2) = (V + v X) /CV + v X) n2 Y2 nl Y2 
(X - �)/(X - q1(V /V )) < O for q1 < X and q2 > X. Y1 Y2 
Q.E.D. 
To complete the static analysis we need the following result 
which indicates the direction of change in indirect utility from 
changes in price. 
Lemma 3: 
For 
3a) 
3b ) 
3c) 
3d) 
Let V1 = [n1, y] and v2 = V[n2, y - (n1 - n2)X]. 
• n2 < n i n1: 
av1/an1 < o 
av2/an1 < o 
av2/an2 < o 
acv2 - v1>/anl < 0 when v < v Y1 Y2 
Proof Lemma 3: 
3 a) 
3b) 
3c) 
3d) 
av1/an1 = Vn(n1• y) < 0 (monotonicity property 
of indirect utility function). 
av2/an1 = v c-x> < o Y2 
av2/an2 = v + V X i V + v a_ < o as X i a_ • n y2 n Y2 -� -� 
acv2 - v1> /an1 [V + V X1 nl Y2 
= - V [X - ql (V /V ) ] < 0 Y2 yl Y2 
as V /V < 1 and q1 < x. yl Y2 
Q.E.D. 
We now collect the results in the following theorem. 
Theorem 1: (Two-Tier Declining Block Rate Comparative Statics) 
• 
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Let n• be defined by D[n• . y; Pl = X. Define the functions n1(n2) and 
• 
n2(n1) by 
• • V(n1• y) = V(n2• y - Cn1 - n2)X) and 
• • 
V Cn1• y) = V<n2• y - (n1 - n2)X) respectively. 
Then equilibritun occurs in the first segment for: 
• • s1 = {(n2• n1)1n i n1 and n2<n1) i n2 i n1l and 
equilibritun occurs in the second segment for: 
• • 
s2 = {(n2, n1>1o i n2 in and n2 i n1 i n1Cn2>l. 
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[Insert Diagram 3 here] 
Proof Theorem 1: The shaded region above the diagonal line in Diagram 
3 represents the set of feasible declining block rate structures. The 
• • 
curve with declining slope which intersects the (n , n ) point is the 
set S of Lemma 2. Suppose we begin at a point on the curve S and 
increase n2 while leaving n1 unchanged. Since we are in a region in 
which both budget segments are feasible, Lemma 3c implies that the 
increase in n2 decreases the utility v2• As we began at a point of 
equal utility and v2 has decreased while v1 remains constant it must 
be the case that budget segment one is pref erred to budget segment 
two. 
Similarly consider a decrease in n1 leaving n2 constant. In 
this case, Lemma 3d applies so that v2 - v1 > 0 and budget segment two 
becomes optimal. In the southwest quadrant above the 45° degree line, 
demand occurs in the second budget segment since optimal demanG for 
• 
prices n1 < n exceeds the block boundary X. The other quadrants are 
similarly derived using the results of Lemma 1 and Lemma 3. 
Q.E.D. 
Remarks: Note that price pairs below the diagonal imply 
increasing or non-decreasing block rate schedules which correspond to 
convex budget sets. The triangular area in the southwest quadrant 
below the diagonal implies optimal demand in the second budget segment 
while the area below the diagonal in the northeast quadrant implies 
demand in the first budget segment. The southeast quadrant which 
• 
includes the boundary n1 = n 
• 
but excludes the boundary n2 = n 
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implies optimal demand at the block boundary X. We further note that 
the set S of equal utility points has measure zero in the price space 
of Diagram 3. 
We now use Diagram 3 to answer simple comparative static 
problems. Suppose for example that we increase the lower block 
boundary. Diagram 4 illustrates that the partition moves to an 
• •  • •  • •  • intersection with the 45° line at the point (n , n ) with n < n 
as x' > X. If equilibrium had initially occurred at point A, the 
discontinuous change in lower block boundary from X to X' would now 
imply that point A corresponds to optimal demand in budget segment one 
versus the initial equilibrium in budget segment two. 
[Insert Diagram 4 here] 
Finally we note that our comparative static analysis applies 
to the more general case of multiple tier declining block rate 
schedules where we interpret n2 as the marginal rate and n1 as the 
intramarginal average price, i.e., the average price up to but not 
including the marginal block. 
III. SPECIFICATION OF PRICE: EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
We now address the issue of price specification with an 
econometric analysis of the 1975 survey of 1502 households carried out 
by the Washington Center for Metropolitan Studies (WCMS) for the 
Federal Energy Administration. Individual household locations 
(identified at the level of primary sampling units) permitted matching 
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of actual rate schedules used in 1975 to each household. The use of 
disaggregated data is necessary to avoid the confounding effects of 
misspecification due to aggregation bias or due to approximation of 
the rate data. 
We resolve four empirical issues related to the estimation of 
the demand for electricity: (1) measured average price and measured 
marginal price are statistically endogenous so that least squares 
techniques are not appropriate for the determination of price 
elasticities. (2) while the rate structure premium adjustment has 
established theoretical merit its statistical contribution is 
negligible. (3) consumer behavior in the demand for electricity 
follows the marginal price specification rather than the average price 
specification. and (4) estimates of price responsiveness are not 
statistically different using the tail-end price rather than the true 
marginal rate. 
1. Endogeneity of Measured Prices 
The general proposition is that e:r.planatory variables which 
utilize the observed consumption level introduce correlation b�tween 
those variables and the error term. To illustrate the direction of 
least squares estimation bias write the demand for electricity 
equation as Q = PP + Z& + £ where p is the measured marginal price 
with coetficient p. Z is a vector of socioeconomic variables with 
coefficient vector & and e is the equation error. For simplicity 
� r I 
assume that p is uncorelated with Z so that P LS = p + p s /p p. An 
unobserved increase in electricity consumption induces a decrease in 
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price so that we expect an a priori negative correlation between 
� 
p and e. The formula for P LS shows that least squares over estimates 
in absolute magnitude the price-response coefficient p.3 
McFadden (1978) and Hausman et al. (1979) have demonstrated 
that an instrumental variable estimation technique provides consistent 
estimates of the electricity demand equation where instruments are 
constructed utilizing predicted rather than actual consumption to 
determine measured prices. In forming predicted consumption levels 
all endogenous variables are purged from the set of e:r.planatory 
variables. One must insure that the instruments so constructed are not 
exact linear combinations of the exogenous variables included in the 
demand for electricity equation. This is usually not a problem given 
the non-linearity of the rate schedule and given the existence of 
other prices which are exogenous. The tail-end block price. for 
example, will be used in exactly this role. 
To establish empirical verification of the hypothesis of 
endogeneity of measured price we apply the specification test due to 
Wu (1973) and recently discussed in Hausman (1978). The methodology 
consists of isolating a group of explanatory variables whose 
endogeneity is under test. Using the result that the least squares 
estimator has zero asymptotic covariance with its difference from the 
instrumental variable estimator, we are able to form a simple 
statistic which is asymptotically chi-squared under the null 
hypothesis of statistical exogeneity for the test group. 
To illustrate the test write the demand for electricity in 
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schematic form as Q = Xp + Zy + e where X is a k-vector of price and 
income terms llllder various specifications and Z is a group of assumed 
exogenous variables. The variables in X are presumed to be suspect of 
endogeneity. The test statistic is then: 
A A I A 
T = ( p IV - p LS) [V[ p IV] 
.. 
A -1 A V[ pLS]] C PIV 
A A 
p LS)- X
2 (k) 
where V is the estimated variance covariance matrix and k is the 
number of coefficients in p. 
The dependent variable in each estimated equation is monthly 
consumption of kilowatt hours of electricity used by the family in 
1975. The socioeconomic variables include appliance ownership dummies 
for the electric dishwasher, electric washing machine, food freezer, 
electric range, color television, black and white television, electric 
clothes dryer, and central air conditioner. To capture tne effects of 
climate, the annual number of cooling degree days (the number of days 
in which the daily average temperature was greater than 65°) and this 
number multiplied by respectively the central air conditioner dummy 
and the number of room air conditioners were included, as well as 
scale variables for the number of rooms, the number of persons, and 
the number of room air conditioners. 4 
Price terms included the average price, measured marginal 
price and the tail-end block rate. These rates are used below in 
various combinations and are taken from the rate schedules prevailing 
in the winter of 1975. 
[Insert Table 1 and 2 here] 
In Table 1 we present the mean values of all variables. To 
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demonstrate the bias induced by least squares llllder the marginal price 
specification we compare the least squares and instrumental variable 
estimates of the equation: Q = e(measured marginal price) + Z& + a. 
For brevity we report the coefficient estimates on the variables: 
measured marginal price, income, electric water heat and electric 
space heat in Table 2. At sample means the price elasticity implied 
by least squares is -0.266 while the instrumental variable estimates 
imply a price elasticity of -0.159. The direction of the bias agrees 
with our a priori expectation that least squares will overestimate in 
magnitude the price sensitivity coefficient. 
Taylor (1975) reports both short- rllll and long-rllll price and 
income elasticities. Of nine estimates of residential elasticities 
two used marginal price. Each of the studies by Houthakk.er (195la, 
195lb) reports short-rllll elasticities of approximately - 0.90.5 Both 
our least squares and instrumental estimates are well below this 
estimate in magnitude but are entirely consistent with other estimates 
of electricity demand price elasticity using an average price 
specification. 6 
The Hausman statistic for the endogeneity test of measured 
marginal price is computed to be 34.18. This well exceeds the 
critical value for a Chi-squared test of any size given the single 
degree of freedom. We note that the respective income elasticities for 
least squares and instrumental variables are 0.118 and 0.109. Both 
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estimates are consistent with those obtained in previous studies. 
If the same test is repeated using measured average price in 
place of measured marginal price we find price elasticities for least 
squares and instrumental variables of respectively -0.437 and -0.416. 
Note that the direction of bias is the same as that obtained with 
measured marginal price�a general increase in price sensitivity 
magnitude. Income elasticities were robustly estimated at 0.120 and. 
0.104 for the two procedures. The Chi-squared statistic was computed 
in this case to be 118.2 which well exceeds the critical value of 3.84 
for a 5 percent test. Parameter estimates for the average price 
specification are reported in Table 3. 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
In summary we remark that previous studies in the demand for 
electricity have undoubtedly been subject to the bias illustrated 
above. The bias has been demonstrated to be statistically significant 
for the two most common specifications of price and is qualitatively 
impressive on the order of 67 percent.7 
2. Rate Structure Premium Adjustment 
From Table 1 we see that the mean value of rate structure 
premium is $3.12 compared to the mean value of income of $1321/month. 
The negligible value of RSP as compared to INCOME implies that the 
difference (INCOME - RSP) could not be distinguished from general 
measurement error in the definition of monthly income. In Table 4 we 
present instrumental variable estimates of the electricity demand 
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equation using the marginal price specification and income adjusted by 
the rate structure premium. 
[Insert Table 4 here] 
Comparison of the estimates in Table 4 with estimates given in 
Table 2 for instrumental variables demonstrates the qualitative 
similarity. Based on these results we do not advocate the rate 
structure premium correction to income in the WCMS data for 1978. 
This confirms the findings of Hausman et al. (1979) for insignificance 
of the RSP adjustment. 
3. Average versus Marginal Price 
Estimation in demand for electricity studies has followed the 
predominant usage of either marginal or average price. A simple 
observation will allow us to nest both the marginal and average price 
specification in a more general model. We have demonstrated above 
that the difference between measured average price and measured 
marginal price is the rate structure premium divided by measured 
consumption. Hence an unrestricted specification of marginal and 
average prices has the form: Q = (measured marginal price)a0 + (Rate 
structure premium/Quantity)a1 + Zo + a. Clearly when a0 equals a1 we 
have the average price specification. When a1 = 0 we have the 
marginal price specification. 
[Insert Table 5 here] 
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Ordinary least squares and instrumental variable estimates for 
the llJlrestricted model are presented in Table 5. For brevity we 
report only the coefficient estimates of measured marginal price, rate 
structure premium/quantity, income, WHE, and SHE. The Hausman 
statistic of 83 .8 with the two degrees of freedom confirms the 
endogeneity of the explanatory variables measured marginal price and 
rate structure premium/quantity. 
Using the instrumental variables estimates in Table 5 we 
compute a Wald test of the hypothesis that the coefficients of 
measured marginal rate and rate structure premium/Q are equal. The 
test statistic which compares the difference in the estimated 
coefficients has a value of 7.09 and is distributed chi-squared with 
one degree of freedom (the number of imposed restrictions). We thus 
reject the average price specification at the 1 percent critical 
level. Furthermore the individual t-statistics for the coefficients 
of measured marginal price and R.SP/Q confirm the marginal price 
specification as the former coefficient is significant while the 
latter is insignificant at the 5 percent level.8 It is interesting to 
note that inspection of the least squares estimates would lead one to 
choose the average price specification over the marginal price 
specification. Given the differential in sum of squared residuals for 
the measured marginal price and average price specifications (using 
the consistent estimates in Tables 2 and 3 respectively) it is likely 
that a non-nested test (see  Pesaran (1974) for example) would also 
discriminate between the two models. We are thus led to conclude that 
consumer behavior in the demand for electricity follows the marginal 
price specification rather than the average price specification. 
4. Measurement Error iu Marginal Price 
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We now consider the impact of the measurement-error 
misspecification which results from the use of the tail-end rate in 
place of the measured marginal rate. In Table 6 we reproduce the 
least squares regression results for this specification. Note that 
least squares estimation provides consistent parameter estimates since 
the tail-end price is by definition exogenous. The use of the tail­
end rate in place of the measured marginal rate introduces measurement 
error in the price variable. However it is not appropriate to apply 
the usual measurement error bias formulae since price is expected to 
reveal significant correlation with the other explanatory variables 
and since the difference between the two measures of price is not a 
mean zero random disturbance. 
[Insert Table 6 here] 
Comparing the estimate of the tail-end price coefficient in 
Table 6 with the consistent estimate of the measured marginal price 
coefficient in Table 2, we see that relative to the standard error the 
difference is not significant. (t = ((-6006.) - (-6828.))/1837. 
0.45). This result is confirmed through the inspection of the 
variables WMPE75 and RATE; the correlation coexficient between the two 
variables in 0.87 and the mean difference is approximately one-third 
of a standard deviation. While there is no specific suggestion that 
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the rate schedules in the WCMS data are flat, these estimates suggest 
that many individuals are close to the tail-end of the rate schedule 
so that measured marginal rates are well approximated by the tail-end 
price. 9 
IV. SIMULATION OF DEMAND WITH ALTFBNATIVE RATE STRUCTURES 
We now consider the problem of determining demand response 
subject to non-marginal changes in the underlying budget constraint 
set. In particular we attempt to estimate changes in expected demand, 
revenue, etc. when consumers are shifted from declining block to 
inverted block rate structures. The inverted block structure has 
gained increasing prominence in recent years in an attempt to 
guarantee the poor a level of electricity consumption which would 
maintain a minimum standard of living in the face of rising 
electricity prices. 
In this section we follow recent empirical studies which 
indicate the importance of population taste variation. In the labor 
supply context. for example, small B:-squareds are symptomatic of the 
inadequacies of explaining observed hours of work under the assumption 
of a representative individual. This source of variability in 
electricity demand is expected to be particularly important when 
considering alternative rate structures aimed at benefiting the low 
income segment of the population. 
We follow the approach of Burtless and Hausman (1978) and 
Hausman (1978) and allow the income parameter to be randomly 
distributed across individuals. The objective of their studies was 
the determination of labor supply with non-linear net wages. Ball 
(1973) had demonstrated the usefulness of the net wage approach and 
defined the concept of virtual income which is identical to our 
definition of income less rate structure premium. 
To compare budget segments, an indirect utility function. 
20 
V[p, y; p]. in prices, income, an unknown income parameter p. is found 
which is consistent with the ass11D1ed demand specification. Each value 
of P between zero and +m gives rise to an associated global optimum 
level of electricity demand given a particular rate structure. The 
probability that desired demand lies in a given range is thus 
equivalent to the probability of an associated range in p. Actual 
demand is assumed to differ from desired demand by an additive 
disturbance 1\• 
In the non-convex budget case consisting of two segments, 
Burtless and Hausman (1978) demonstrate that desired demand will fall 
• in the steeper budget segment for 0 � p � p and will fall in the 
• • 
marginal segment for P i p. The parameter p denotes a point in the 
parameter space of equal indirect utility for both segments 
• • 
V[p1• y1; P ] E VCp2• y2; P ]. If F(11. p) denotes the cumulative 
distribution function for 1\ and p and q. denotes desired demand in the 
J 
jth segment (j = 1 or 2) then the likelihood of observed demand q is 
• 
Prob J� f (q - q1)dF[11. p] + s+: J (q - �)dF[11. p] 1\ p 1\ 
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The full-information maximum likelihood solution to convex and 
non-convex budget set estimation is implementable provided simple 
distributional assumptions are made concerning � and p. If more than 
one or two parameters are assumed to vary in the population, the 
requirement of evaluating multiple integrals over nonrectangular 
regions implies too complex a problem for maximum likelihood. 
As an alternative to the maximum likelihood solution we 
consider consistent estimation of moments of the random parameter 
distribution. Write the demand equation as: 
(6) y = 
J" 
\ . .  L a.X. + X p 
J=l J J 
+ 8 
• 
where a. is the random coefficient of variable X., p is as Lxl column 
J J 
• 
vector of non-random but unknown parameters for the variables X , and 
e is an additive disturbance. We assume that a. - a. = v. where 
J J J 
E[v.] = 0 and E[v:] = a: and that E[e] = 0, E[e2J = a2• Under the J J J 
• 
maintained assumption that the X. and X are uncorrelated 
J 
asymptotically with the disturbances e and v., we could proceed to 
J 
estimate the parameters aj, p
*, and a� . a2 using the methods of 
Hildreth and Hauck (1968). The Hildreth-Hauck result is not 
applicable in the presence of stochastic regressors which we have 
demonstrated to be an important consideration in the specification of 
demand subject to a non-linear rate schedule. 
Fortunately, a simple alternative to the Hildreth-Hauck method 
exists which does guarantee consistency in the presence of stochastic 
regressors. We present the results in Theorem 2. 
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Theorem 2: Consistent Estimation of the Random Parameter Model with 
Stochastic and Non-Stochastic Regressors. 
Assume that vj and e are uncorrelated, v. and X. J J 
are 
• 1 , uncorrelated, X non-stochastic, and plim(TXje) # O. 
( i) Equation (6) implies y I - . .  a.X. + X p + v where v 
j J J 
E(v) 0, E[v2] 2 I 2 2 a + a.X. 
J J J 
e+ I v.X. 
J J J 
(ii) Instrumental variables yields consistent estimates of the 
• 
parameters a. and p • 
J 
(iii) Consistent estimates of the variances a2 and a: are obtained in 
J 
an awi:iliary regression of the squared residuals from 
instrumental variables on a constant term and the variables �. 
Proof of Theorem 2: See Appendix. 
Remark: While consistency of the estimates of a: and a2 is 
J 
guaranteed, standard errors given in the auxiliary regression 
procedure are incorrect. We implement this procedure for the 
specification given in Table 2 of section III: 
J 
(7) Q = a(measured marginal rate) + p(income) + Z6 + e where p = p + ep 
[Insert Table 7 here] 
Results of the auxiliary regression of squared fitted 
residuals are presented in Table 7. The estimates in Table 7 provide 
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an indirect method of decomposing the total variance into the variance 
of a and the variance of (ap • Income). From Table 7 we have: 
(8) 
.. 2 e t (0.8447EH5)1 + (0.1762&-l) (lncomet)
2 + € t 
.. .. 
where e t is the instrllDlental variable estimated residual and t t 
denotes the fitted residual in the auiiliary regression. Adjusting 
for degrees of freedom, equation (8) implies: 
(9) 1 I .. 2 (744-19) e t = (0 .8447E!-15 )(744) /(744-19) + (0 .1762E-1)(744) /(744-19) t 
2 p •c7!4) � (Incomet) + 0 = var(a) + var[aplncome] . 
Since the standard error of the regression in (7) is (355.6), 
and income has population mean (1322.0) and variance (.4508E!-6) we 
find var[a] = (.866837El-5) and var[aplncome] = (.39753E!-5). Over 30 
percent of total variance is th11S accounted for by randomness in the 
income taste parameter. Hansman (1981), by way of contrast. reports 
that virtnally all une1plained variation in labor supply may be 
attributed to taste variation. 
For the purpose of making explicit probability statements we 
assllDle that P is log-normally distributed so that log P is a normal 
random variable with mean µ and variance A2• The log- normal 
distribution has the desirable feature that p has positive support. 
This is consistent with the assllDlption that income is a normal good. 
Furthermore, the translation between the observed moments (p, a:) and 
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the moments (µ, A2) is accomplished in a simple calculation. An 
alternative assllDlption of the truncated normal distribution for p 
would not allow this simple translation and would be eqnally 
arbitrary. 
Recall that the log-normal distribution for p implies 
p 1 2 2 2 2 E (p) = exp[µ + 2A ] and ap = var(p) = (exp(A )-1)exp(2µ + A ). 
From these we find: 
(10) A2 2 -2 ln[ap/ p + 1] and 
(11} µ = ln[(ji2/ca: + i2>·5>l 
2 From Table 2, P = 0.0757 and from Table 7, ap = 0.01762 so that we 
estimate µ= -3.2834 and A2 = 1.4048. The median of distribution for 
p occurs at exp[µ] = 0.0375 which indicates the direction of skewness 
relative to the mean of 0.0757. A simple reslllt shows that 
approximately 71 percent of p distribution lies below the mean value. 
Having determined the P distribution we may now make 
probabilistic comparisons between alternative rate structures. 
The results of Dubin and McFadden (1982) demonstrate that tAe 
indirect utility function 
(12) 
-pp. 2 V[pi.yi] = e 
i[yi + Ca./f,)pi + a./p + Z6/p] 
is consistent with the demand equation 
(13) X. = -Vp. /Vy. = py. + a.p. + Z6 
1 1 1 1 1 
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The coefficients and explanatory variables in (13J are chosen 
to be consistent with the specification of desired demand given in 
(7). Price pi and income yi are defined below to follow actual budget 
segments. Using (12) and (13) we note that 
(14) 
-ppi 2 V[pi, yi] = e [Xi/p + a/p ] 
The distribution of the random variable V[pi.yi] induced by 
distribution of p is not readily calculated in closed-form given the 
complicated form of equation (14). We approximate (14) by a Taylor's 
series expansion of p aroUJ1.d its observed mean p: 
·p] -
(15) V[pi, yi;p] - V[pi.yi;p] 
aV[pi, yi. (JI - P> 
where the slope av/ap is given by 
(16) avCpi. yi;Pl/ap 
-ppi 2 -3 e [(jly.-X.)/p - 2eP ] 1 1 
-ppi 2 + e [Xi/p + a/p ](-pi) 
-ppi 3 2 (e /p )[p (yi-piX. )-p(X .+ p.e)-2e] 1 1 1 
We now consider two probability calculations. In the first 
case consumers are assumed to choose between two segments of a 
declining two-part tariff. In the second case we compare inverted 
rate with declining block structures. The analysis and empirical 
results focus on the two-part tariff structure considered in Section 
II above. 
CASE I. Declining Two-Part Tariffs 
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Recall that the declining two-part tariff assumes a price n1 
for consumption up to and including an amoUJ1.t X and price n2 for any 
additional consumption. We want to find the probability that v1 is 
greater than V2 while taking into accoUJ1.t the possibility that certain 
ranges of prices make either budget segment infeasible. Given the 
assumption of a declining tariff we note that n2 < n1 so that: 
(17) • Prob[V1 L V2l = ProbCV1 L v21n2 < n 
• i n1l • Prob[n2 < n 
• • + ProbCV1 L v21n i n2l • Prob[n i n2l 
• • + ProbCV1 L v21n > n1l • Prob[n > n1l 
where Vi= V[pi, yi;p] is defined in (15) with pl = n1• y1 = y, 
i nl] 
P2 = n2, and y2 = y - Cn1-n2)X. (Here y without the subscript denotes 
total income.) • • The price n defined by D[n , y;p] • X is stochastic 
given the UJ1.kn.own distribution of p. To evaluate (17) we note that 
the first term is simply the joint probability 
• 
ProbCV1 L v2 and n2 < n i n1l. In the second term, the condition 
• 
n i n2 implies v1 L v2 with certainty since the second segment is not 
feasible. Similarly the third term is zero as v1 may not be selected 
• when n is strictly larger than n1• Thus (17) implies: 
• • (18) Prob[V1 L V2l = Prob[V1 L v2 and n2 < n i n1l + Prob[n i n2l 
Let m. = aV[p., y.;pl/ap and ui = V[p., y.;p] so that the first term in 1 1 1 1 1 
(18) may be rewritten (using equation (15)) as: 
* 
(19) Prob[V1 L v2 and n2 < n i n11 
Prob [ (m2-m1) (j3-13) i 
(u1-u2) 
Prob[(m2-�) (13-13) i Cu1-u2) 
.. 
X-By-Z& and n2 ( a i n11 
and 
.. .. 
x-x x-x 2 - 1 
-- < 13-13 < -- ] y - y 
where we have defined x1 = api + 13Yi + Z&. We similarly find that 
the second term in (18) may be written as: 
,. 
* X-By-Z& 
(20) Prob[n i n21 = Prob[ a i n21 
x-x2 Prob [13 - ,, < -- ]. .. - y 
When m2 - m1 ) 0, (18) implies: 
(21) 
,. 
x-x2 
Prob[V1 L V21 = Prob[-y- i i3 
.. 
x-xl ul -u2) ]. i min( -y- , m2-� 
When m2 - � < 0, {18) implies: 
,. .. 
(22) Prob [V1 L v2 l 
ul-u2 x-x2 x-xl 
= Prob[max(--, --) i i3 i --] m2-ml y y 
When m2 
> > m1 we note that v1 ( v2 as u1 ( u2• Thus: 
{
l if u1 L u2 {23) Prob[V1 L V2] = o otherwise 
As an application we consider three empirical examples. In 
the first example we assume that consumers choose between their 
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observed block and an artifical block consisting of a flat rate set at 
the intra-marginal average price. Since the observed block is 
28 
feasible by definition and highly correlated with the desired block, 
we expect that the probability of block switching to bo very low. To 
illustrate this example we examine tho rate structure faced by 
individuals living in Boston, Massachusetts in 1975. 
[Insert Figure lA and lb here] 
Figure la plots the e:r:ponditure or outlay schedule while 
Figure lb illustrates the declining block rate schedule. In our 
sub-sample of tho WCll:S data ten households are located in this primary 
sampling unit. In addition to the tariff prices, a fixed charge of 
$1.43 is applied to the bill which appears in the non-zero intercept 
of Figure la. The symbol R in Figure la denotes a rate boundary; the 
symbol A denotes an observation. Table 8 lists the observed demands 
and corresponding e:r:penditure for households in Boston, Massachusetts. 
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TABLE 8 
Quantity Ex]!enditure 
1. 473 20.43 
2. 334 15 .29 
3. 192 9.82 
4. 300 14.04 
5. 246 12.03 
6. 298 13 .96 
7. 373 16.73 
8. 526 22.38 
9. 263 12.67 
10. 374 16.77 
Consider household #1 with consumption in the tail-end block 
and marginal price *0.03693/KWll. The lower block bolllldary for this 
household is 250 KWH and the intra-marginal average price is *0.04876 
since (($0.04876)(250)) is the total cost of 250 KWH. In the notation 
of Section II we set n1 = 0.04876, n2 = 0.03693, y1 = Income, 
y2 = (lncome-Cn1-n2)X). with X = 250. The population average value 
for Prob[V1 L V2] is 0.1688 with a standard deviation of 0.4025. In 
doing the calculation we note that Prob[V1 L V2] was evaluated by (211 
in 1 of 744 cases, by (22) in 216 of 744 cases. and by (18) in the 
remaining 527 of 744 cases. In 79 of 744 cases, the calculated value 
of u1 was greater than Uz• We thus have folllld strong evidence that 
the observed block is the predicted optimal block. 
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As a second example consider the effect of a lllliform increase 
of 30 percent in the observed lower block bolllldary, X, for each 
household. In this case we expect that a greater number of households 
will find that the first budget segment yields greater utility. If we 
repeat the probability calculation we find a population average value 
of 0.3382 for Prob[V1 L V2l with standard deviation of 0.551�. The 30 
percent increase in lower block bolllldary therefore induces a 16.94 
percent increase in the likelihood that individual will select the 
intra-marginal price over the observed marginal rate. While it is 
true that individual predicted probabilities will differ from the 
sample average values, we feel that the magnitude of the difference in 
population means is large enough to indicate a systematic behavioral 
shift. 
As a final example we assume consumers choose between their 
observed block and the block immediately preceding. The probability 
calculation must insure that feasibility is respected at all times. 
For household #1, we would set n1 = 0.04093, n2 = 0.03693, 
y1 =Income, y2 = (lncome-Cn1-n2)X) with X = 250. The population 
average value for Prob[V1 L V2l is 0.1723 with standard deviation 
0.4395 confi:miing the supposition that the observed block is not far 
from the desired block. 
CASE II. Inverted �h!! Tariff and Flat Rates 
To compare declining block rates with inverted rates it would 
be useful to examine a time-series of individuals who are observed in 
declining block and an inverted block regimes. Unfortunately, the 
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1975 WCMS survey includes only households facing declining block rate 
structures. Nevertheless, it is both possible and desirable to use 
the 1975 cross -sectional data to derive structural estimates of taste 
parameters which enable hypothetical probability comparisons. 
We have selected primary sampling unit #111 in the WO.IS survey 
which comprises Boston, Massachusetts for such a calculation. From 
Table 8, we note that mean consumption is 337.90 KWH per month with a 
standard deviation of 102 .49 KWH. Vie choose a two-part inverted 
tariff with a single block boundary selected at approximately one -
standard deviation below the mean value. The prices in the two-
tariffs are selected so that the initial block has a rate 
approximately equal to the prevailing tail-end rate under declining 
block rates, and so that average consumption reproduces the average 
expenditure level of $15.41 per month. Figure 2 presents the two -part 
inverted tariff schedule chosen for our calculations. 
Corresponding to the linear approximation of equation (10) we 
define 
(24) w. 1 
z. 1 
zi + Li(j3- j3}, i 
V[pi, yi;j3] and Li 
1,2 where 
avcp., y. ;"j31 /a13. 
1 1 
(We use the symbols zi and Li as distinguished from ui and mi to 
denote the inverted tariff calculation.) The analysis of Section I I  
indicates that w1 i w2 as rr2 � rr* whenever rr2 L rr1; the condition for 
an inverted two-part tariff. 
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Consider the probability of each segment having maximal 
utility when compared to the base case v1 = u1 + �(p - ji°). The first 
budget segment will have maximal utility when {W2 > v1 and w1 > w2J. 
The second budget segment in the inverted tariff will have maximal 
utility when {W2 > v1 and W2 > W1J. The base case v1 has maximal 
utility in the complement of the union of the two above sets. We 
have: 
(25) Prob[Wl > v1 and W1 > W21 
x-x2 
= Prob[Cl1 - �)(p - P> L - Cz1 - u1) and CP - P> i -y-] 
where X. = ap. + py. + Z& and p., y. , and X are defined for the two-
J J J J J 
part inverted tariff. Similarly, 
(26) Prob[W2 > v1 and W2 > W11 
x-x2 ProbC<l2 - �> <P - P> l - Cz2 - p.1> and <P - P> l -y-1 
We have made these calculations for the ten households in 
Boston, Massachusetts using the hypothetical inverted two-part tariff 
of Figure 2 and observed marginal rates for the base case. The mean 
value of the probability in (25) is 0.70 with standard deviation 0.46. 
The mean value of the probability in (21) is 0.125 with standard 
deviation 0.183. The probability in the base case has mean value 
0.1747 with standard deviation 0.517. 
Finally we compute the probability that W1 is greater than W2 
in a choice between the two segments. In this situation we have 
(27) • Prob[W1 > w2J = Prob[n2 > n ] 
x-x 
Prob [ (Jl - in � --21 y 
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For tho sample of ten households we find a mean value of 0.01897. The 
probabilities in (25), (26), and (27) are sufficient to characterize 
the population shares of desired demands and could be used to 
calculate expected demand, deadweight loss, revenue or other policy 
variables. 
V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
This paper has reviewed the theory and estimation of price 
specification in the demand for electricity. We have seen that t.ne 
price space which parameterizes a quantity dependent rate schedule may 
be partitioned in such a way as to uniquely determine demand in each 
price tier. Furthermore it is possible to use the price partition to 
conduct gross and marginal comparative static analysis. This approach 
might be successfully applied to an empirical mapping of the marginal 
revenue function facing a given utility. 
We have further explored the empirical specification of price 
in a class of electricity demand models and have demonstrated that (1) 
measured average price and measured marginal price are statistically 
endogenous. (2) the statistical contribution of the rate structure 
premium adjustment is negligible. (3) consumer behavior follows the 
marginal rather than the average price specification, and (4) 
estimated price elasticities are not significantly different using the 
tail-end price in place of the measured marginal rate. 
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Finally, we have demonstrated a practical way of comparing 
alternative rate structures in their impact on demand response. The 
methodology was applied in a comparison of a prevailing rate structure 
with a hypothetical inverted structure in order to determine t.ne 
individual tier probability shares. 
VARIABLE NAMEa 
AKWH75 
RATE 
AVPRICE 
WMPE75 
INCOME 
RSP 
WHE 
SHE 
ROOMS 
PERSONS 
CAC 
CDDCAC 
RACNUM 
CDDRACNUM 
AU TOW SH 
AUTODSH 
FOODFRZ 
ELECRNGE 
ECLTHDR 
BWTV 
CLRTV 
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TABLE 1 
DESCRIPTION MEAN 
monthly consumption of electricity in 1795 916.5 
measured marginal price in 1975 .02427 
measured average price in 1975 .03128 
winter tail-end block price for electricity .02138 
in 1975 
monthly income of household head 1322 
measured rate structure premium 5.151 
electric water heat dummy 0.2728 
electric space heat dummy 0.1411 
number of rooms in household 6.078 
number of persons in household 3.550 
central air-conditioning dummy 0.2890 
(annual cooling degree days) * (CAC) 463.7 
number of room air-conditioners .4382 
(annual cooling degrees days) * (RACNUM) 642.3 
automatic washing machine dummy 0.8898 
automatic dishwasher dummy 0.4921 
food freezer dummy 0.5323 
electric range dummy 0.6411 
electric clothes dryer dummy 0.4990 
black and white television dummy 0.5806 
color television dummy 0.7446 
a
A subsample of the original 1502 observations was selected so that all 
price and income data were positive and so that complete information was 
available for each individual. 
TABLE 2 
VARIABLE
a LS ESTIMATES IV ESTIMATES 
Measured Marginal Price -10050. -6006. 
(-5.909)b (-3.269) 
Income .08169 .07570 
(3. 330) (3.071) 
WHE 405.6 404.5 
(10.22) (10.15) 
SHE 694.8 714.9 
(14. 08) (14.40) 
R2 .7074 .7051 
Number of Observations 744 744 
Sum of Squared Residuals • 909lfE+8 .9166E+8 
Standard Error of Regression 354.2 355.6 
ain Tables 2-6 coefficient estimates are not reported for the 
variables: PERSONS, BWTV, ROOMS, RMCLCAC, CDDCAC, CAC, RACNUM, 
CDDRACNUM, FOODFRZ, ELECRNGE, CLRTV, ECLTHDR,_AUTODSH, AUTOWSH, 
and the intercept. The dependent variable is AKWH75. 
h
t-statistics presented in parentheses. 
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TABLE 3 TABLE 4 
VARIABLE LS ESTIMATES IV ESTIMATES VARIABLE IV ESTIMATES 
Average Price -12810. -4266. Measured Marginal Price -6006. 
(-8. 731) (-2.563) (-3.269) 
Income .08304 .07221 NETINC .7560E-Ol 
(3.484) (2.959) (3.067) 
WHE 388.8 398.1 WHE 404.5 
(10.05) (10.06) (10 .15) 
SHE 669.2 719.6 SHE 715.0 
(13.90) (14.56) (14.40) 
R2 .7225 .7095 R2 .7050 
Number of Observations 744 744 Number of Observations 744 
Sum of Squared Residuals .8626E+8 .9029E+8 Sum of Squared Residuals . 9167E+8 
Standard Error of Regression 344.9 352.9 Standard Error of Regression 355.6 
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TABLE 5 TABLE 6 
VARIABLE LS ESTIMATES IV ESTIMATES VARIABLE LS ESTIMATES 
Measured Marginal Rate -10130. -6430. WMPE75 -6828. 
(-6.158) (-3.352) (-3.644) 
Rate Structure Premium/Q -22410 10040. Income .08299 
(-7.236) (1. 777) (3. 277) 
Income .07702 .07846 WHE 414.1 
(3.248) (3.068) (10.26) 
WHE 374.9 418.4 SHE 721.7 
(9.717) (9.961) (14.51) 
SHE 673.6 722.1 R
2 .6988 
(14.10) (14.00) Number of Observations 744 
R2 .7271 .6840 Sum of Squared Residuals .9361E+8 
Number of Observations 744 744 Standard Error of Regression 359.3 
Sum of Squared Residuals .8481E+8 .9823E+8 
Standard Error of Regression 342.3 368.3 
TABLE 7 
AUXILARY REGRESSION OF SQUARED FITTED RESIDUALS 
ORDINARY LEAST SQUARES 
VARIABLE 
Constant 
2 (Income) 
R-Squared 
Sum of Squared Residuals 
Number of Observations 
* 
ESTIMATED COEFFICIENT 
(Standard Error) 
0.8447E+l5 
(0.2827E+5)* 
0.1762E-l 
(0.9540E-2) * 
0.458E-2 
0.1984E+l5 
744 
Standard errors are not corrected. 
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FOOTNOTES 
1. The author wishes to thank Ernst Berndt, Dani el McFadden, 
2. 
Franklin Fisher, and J erry Hausman for helpful comments. This 
paper revises and extends a chapter from the author's M.I.T. Ph.D 
thesis. "Economic Theory and Estimation of the Demand for 
Cons11D1er Durable Goods and their Utilization: Appliance Choice 
and the Demand for Electricity, • Massachusetts Institute 01 
Technology. An earlier version of this paper circulated under 
the title, "Rate Structure and Price Specification in the Demand 
for Electricity.• 
A source of bias not discussed in this paper arises from the 
endogeneity of appliance ownership dummies. Generally, 
unobserved factors which influence the choice of a durable will 
also influence its use. For a complete discussion of this 
problem see Dubin and McFadden ( 1979) who find evidence that this 
leads to under estimates (in magnitude) of the true price 
effects. 
3. This result is further true when p is correlated with z .  
However, it i s  not in general possible to determine the magnitude 
of the bias when several explanatory variables are correlated 
with the error term. 
4. Issues of specification are considered in Dubin (1982). 
s .  The rate schedule in Houthakker' s study consisted of a connect 
4 7  
charge and a fixed marginal price. The marginal price elasticity 
estimated by Houthakker is not tainted by simultaneity bias. 
6. Studies by Acton, Mitchell, and Mowill (1976) and Taylor, 
Blattenberger, and Verleger (1977), find short-run price 
elasticities from -.08 to -. 35 with endogenous marginal price 
specifications. 
7. The bias for the average price specification is not as large at 
approximately 5 percent. 
8. We have rejected the null hypothesis that demand for electricity 
follows the average price specification. This, of course, is not 
equivalent to accepting the marginal price specification. 
However, given the sign change on the coetficient of { RSP/Q) and 
its standard error we cannot rej ect the marginal price 
specification. 
9. Using the results of Section II, we have seen that 
RSP = X{n1--n2). As average price less marginal price equals 
RSP/Q we have average price = n2 + {X/Q){ n1--n2). For Q > >  X, 
average price and marginal price will be approximately equal. 
Thus individuals with demand much larger than the tail-end block 
will have approximately equal marginal, average, and tail-end 
prices. 
10. For further details concerning life-line rates the reader may 
consult Berg and Roth (1976). 
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